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SUMMARY OF PETITIONER HARRISON'S REPLY TO
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION RESPONSE BRIEF
ARGUMENT
A. NO LIABILIY EXISTS FOR MOULTON'S WAGES UNDER
ASSOCIATION ARGUMENT UNDER U.C.A. §34-28-2

The Respondent/Appellee the Utah Labor Commission (the
"Commissioner") appears to argue that the Petitioners/Appellants Integrita,
LLC, Wendy Harrison & Design-Build Solutions, LLC (collectively

•

"Harrison" and separately "Integrita," Wendy Harrison or "DBS") argument
"misses the point" and argues that U. CA. §34-28-2 does not require "that
the employees working for an unincorporated business organization that is
not a separate legal entity must be employed by the association as opposed
to the persons who created the association." [Arg. Pg 11 Appellee BriefJ
The Commissioner is incorrect in claiming that U. CA. §34-28-2 does
not require that the employee must be hired by the association in order to
hold Harrison liable for Moulton' s wages as members of an association.
U. CA. §34-28-2 does require that the association itself had to employ

Moulton in order to create liability of the association and its members. The
Utah Supreme Comt concurs. The Utah Supreme Court in Heaps v.

Nuriche, LLC, 345 P.3d 655 at ,I14, 2015 UT 26 stated, "The statutory

definition of employer includes 'every person, firm, partnership, association,
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this state, and any agent or
officer of any of the above-mentioned classes, employing any person in this
state.' UTAH CODE§ 34-28-2(1)(c) (emphasis added). While the phrase

'agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes' encompasses a large
group of individuals, that phrase is narrowed by the last clause of the
definition. The last clause-' employing any person in this state '-modifies
each of the terms in the preceding list. Thus, the statute limits the definition
of employer to one who employs."
Harrison may have incorrectly assumed that the Trial Court concluded
that the association between Integrita and TJ Enterprises & Acoustical, Inc.
("TJ Enterprises") operated under a common name, "lntegrita." This
assumption may have been in error as the Trial Court does not expressly
state th.is conclusion, but kind of suggested a common name when it stated
that the contracts with Horizon Retail & Construction, Inc. ("Horizon") were
in the name of Integrita and "all work was carried on in that name." (See
bottom of page 8, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711726]). Arguably this is incorrect as Horizon was also a party to the contracts
and as the general contractor, "all of the work" would have been perfo1med
under its name as well. There was no common name for any association.

2

The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the issue whether there is
a culpable association. In Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, 321
P.3d 1067 (Utah 2013) the Utah Supreme ruled that criminal gangs can be
sued as an association under URCP Rule 17(d). This Rule demonstrates that
there are two requisites for suit to be filed against an association. First
requisite is where two or more persons conduct business and the second
requisite is such business is under a common name of the association.
(Emphasis added) See URCP Rule 17(d) and Weber County v. Ogden Trece,
138, id. This is supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in BYU v

Tremco, 110 P.3d 678,684 (Utah 2005). The Court explained at 117, "Rule

l 7(d) is procedural, not substantive. It contemplates a situation where a
plaintiff brings suit against two or more associates that have joined together
under a common name to transact business. By its plain language, [3] rule
17 (d) provides that an unincorporated association may be sued under the
name used by the collective associates to carry out their business. Utah R.
Civ. P. 17(d)." The Court in BYUv Tremco, id. at 684119 found that
BYU's argument to find Tremco and others liable under a theory they were
an unincorporated association failed since there was no common name of the
alleged association and furthem10re because they did not sue this alleged
association under a common name.
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In this case we do not have an "association" because we do not have a
business operating under a common name. Our argument was and is that
there has to be a common name before there is a culpable association and
then in order to find the association liable [and its members] it must be the
employer. In this case it was stipulated by the parties that Ted Gurule hired
Scott Moulton. See page 2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order, Stipulated Facts No. 3 [711-726] It is important to note that even if
there were an association under a common name, the fact that it did not
employ Moulton negates liability of such association under U. CA. §34-28-2.
Since the Commissioner claims that Petitioners were part of an
association that employed Moulton, it should also· be pointed out that the
Trial Court determined that the members of the association were Integrita,
LLC dba Design-Build Solutions and TJ Enterprises, not Ted Gurule or
Wendy Harrison or Design-Build Solutions, LLC. See pages 8-9 Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-726].
B. NO LIABILIY EXISTS FOR MOULTON'S WAGES UNDER JOINT
VENTURE ARGUMENT

We disagree with the Commissioner's assertion that sharing of losses
is not a deciding factor in determining whether there is as a joint venture or
whether there is not a joint venture. We addressed the issue as the Trial
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Court presented this as a factor evidencing a joint venture. It is instructive to
note that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact appear on their face as
demonstrating that there was no sharing of losses. Integrita may separately
incur a loss related to defective work under the Horizon contracts; whereas,
this did not fall on TJ Enterprises. TJ Enterprises on the other hand would
have been solely liable for labor expenses exceeding income. See page 11
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-726]. The Utah
Supreme Court made it clear that sharing of losses was one of the essential
elements of a joint venture, unless there was an agreement to the contrary.
In this case there was no evidence or anything presented evidencing a
contrary agreement. See Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v 51-SPR-L.L.C.,
183 P .3d 248 at 1 16 (UT 2008) "The only element at issue in this appeal is
the fifth element: a duty to share in the losses. The duty to share losses is an
important element of a joint venture. Indeed, loss sharing is a critical
distinction between an investment-type relationship-in which the first four
elements may be present, but investors have no duty to share in the losses
beyond the amount of their investment-and a joint venture relationship. For
this reason, 'a contract not to share losses weighs heavily against pa1inership
because it is so inconsistent with the standard partnership form.' Bromberg

and Ribstein on Partnership, § 2.07(d)(2) (Supp.2006); see also McCulley
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Fine Arts Gallery, Inc. v. 'X" Partners, 860 S.W.2d 473,479
(Tex.Ct.App.1993) ('Generally, the absence of a provision to share losses
indicates the lack of intent to create a partnership.')."
As for the statement made by the Commission "That they agreed to
different measures as to how much of the profit each should receive does not
alter the fact that they each had a right to share the profit." If the proceeds
from Horizon exceeded the cost of labor, materials and Integrita's 2 1/2%
fixed income, that would amount to profit. 1 Harrison was not entitled to
any portion or share of this profit as it all went TJ Gurule under the TJ
Enterprise name. See page 6 ,I21, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order [711-726]. Therefore, as a matter of fact there was no sharing of
profit.
As for relying on Vern Shutte & Sons v J.R. Broadbent, 473 P.2d 885
(Utah 1970) "being misplaced," Harrison disagrees. This is still good Utah
law and well cited case for the following point of Utah law: The Utah
Supreme Court at page 886 stated, "In summary we see that in order to
create a joint adventure it is not enough that the parties act in concert to
achieve some economic objective. The ultimate inquiry is whether the
"A common definition for 'profits' is 'the excess of returns over
expenditures in a transaction or series of transactions."' Penelko, Inc. v. John
Price Assoc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1982), ref. Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary (1 st Ed. 1973).
1
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parties manifested by their conduct a desire to commingle their profits,
control, and risks in achieving the objective.

* * * An agreement, express or

implied, for the sharing of profits among the coventurers is indispensable· to
the creation of the joint venture; and the profit accruing must be joint and
not several." (ref Williston on Contracts [3d Ed.], §318A, p. 571). The
Supreme Court went on to state, "The California court observed that
although the profits of each of the two participating corporate entities were
dependent on the overall success of the project, neither was to share in the
profits or losses that the other might realize or suffer. Although each
received substantial payments, neither had an interest in the payments
received by the other. The court concluded that under these circumstances
no joint venture existed. In the instant action, the undisputed evidence
indicated that the profits accruing to either party to the BroadbentFredrickson contract were several and not joint. Under such circumstances
the cattle feeding transaction was not, as a matter of law, a joint venture."
In this case Harrison had absolutely no interest in the profit, if any,
received by Ted Gurule and TJ Enterprises and they in tum had no interest
in the fixed income received by Haffison. Therefore, Harrison contends that
as a matter of law no joint venture exists in this case.
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C. Wendy Harrison is not Personally Liable for Moulton's
Unpaid Wages.
The Commissioner contends that "Harrison held herself out as the
agent of the association and is liable for unpaid wages." The Trial Court on
the other hand concluded that Wendy Harrison was personally liable to
Moulton pursuant to U.C.A. §34-28-2 because she was an officer of Integrita
and therefore an agent of the joint venture. The Utah Supreme Court was
clear that an agent is not held personally liable, unless such individual
personally hired the employee. There was never any evidence presented that
indicated that Wendy Harrison personally employed Moulton and as such
she is not liable under Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 345 P.3d 655 at ,I14, 2015 UT
26. The Utah Supreme Court made it clear at 118, "In summary, we hold that
Managers are not personally liable under the UPWA because they did not
personally employ Employees. Instead, Managers were acting as agents of
Nuriche."
The Commissioner supports his theory that Wendy Harrison as agent
of the association is liable for Moulton's unpaid wages, Citing Grazer v
Jones, 2012 UT 58, ,II 1,289 P.3d 437. However, whether she was an agent

with actual authority or as the Commissioner suggests, an agent with
apparent authority does not change the Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, id.
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D.

MOULTON NOT THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER
INTEGRITA'S CONTRACTS AND LIEN WAIVERS WITH HORIZON

The Commissioner's argument is fatally flawed in that the Commissioner
cites as his authority for arguing the Contract between Integrita and Horizon
expressly provides for Moulton' s wages, is the contract language used by the
Court at page 14, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711726]. The language used by the Court is not the language actually found in
the contract itself. [See Stipulated Exhibits 2, 3 & 4]. Although we recited
the contract verbatim in the Appellants' Brief, it is worthy of again setting
forth herein, as a reading of such will dispel any notion that such indemnity
agreement expressly or even remotely makes Moulton a third-party
beneficiary entitled to receive unpaid wages. This indemnification provision
of the Contracts between Integrita and Horizon states, "To the fullest extent
permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the Contractor, Landlord, Tenant and the Owner, their agents,
consultants, and employees from any and all claims for bodily injury and
property damage that may arise from the performance of the Subcontractors
Work or anyone employed directly or indirectly by any of them or by
anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable"
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The Commissioner does not provide any argument or legal authority
in supp01i of his position that Harrison are liable for Moulton's unpaid
wages because a lawsuit was settled between Horizon and Integrita.
CONCLUSION

Harrison respectfully prays that this Court reverse the Order of the
Trial Court for the following reasons:
1. The Trial Court applied U. C.A. §34-28-2 to declare that TJ
Enterprises and Integrita formed an association which in tum employed
Moulton. However, Ted Gurule employed Moulton. Therefore, under this
statute an association did not hire Moulton and Integrita is not liable for
Moulton's wages.
Since the alleged association does not operate under a common name,
there is no basis to assign liability thereunder.
2. There was no joint venture as a matter of law as there was no
sharing of profits or of losses.
3. Wendy Harrison was not personally liable for Moulton's unpaid
wages under UC.A. §34-28-2 because she did not personally employ
Moulton.
4. Moulton was not expressly made a third-party beneficiary under
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the contracts and lien waivers between Horizon and Integrita and therefore
@

not entitled to unpaid wages from Integrita.
Dated this 26th day of February, 2016.

David E. Ross II

Attorney for Petitioners

@
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